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Abstract
We argue in this paper in favor of a rather parsimonious theoretical approach to the study of the
domestic impact of Europeanization. Whether we study policies, politics, or polities, a misfit
between European-level and domestic processes, policies, or institutions constitutes the necessary
condition for expecting any change. However, adaptational pressures alone are insufficient. There
must be mediating factors enabling or prohibiting domestic change and accounting for the
empiri-cally observable differential impact of Europe. We have then introduced two pathways
leading to domestic changes which are theoretically grounded in rationalist and sociological
institutionalisms, respectively. On the one hand, rationalist institutionalism follows a logic of
resource redistribution emphasizing the absence of multiple veto points and the presence of
supporting institutions as the main factors facilitating change. On the other hand, sociological
institutionalism exhibits a sociali-zation and learning account focussing on norm entrepreneurs as
"change agents" and the presence of a cooperative political culture as the main mediating factors.
We claim that Europeanization might lead to convergence in policy outcomes, but at best to
"clustered convergence" and continu-ing divergence with regard to policy processes and
instruments, politics, and polities.
Kurzfassung
Dieses Papier stellt einen relativ einfach gefaßten theoretischen Ansatz vor, um die Wirkung der
Europäisierung auf der mitgliedstaatlichen Ebene zu untersuchen. Dabei bildet "Misfit" die
notwendige Bedingung für jegliche Art von Wandel, unabhängig davon, ob politische Programme,
politische Prozesse oder politische Institutionen Gegenstand der Untersuchung sind. Ob der daraus
resultierende Anpassungsdruck jedoch tatsächlich innerstaatlichen Wandel auslöst, hängt von
bestimmten Faktoren ab, die Anpassung befördern oder behindern. Es werden zwei Pfade
vorgestellt, durch die innerstaatlicher Wandel hervorgebracht werden kann und die sich auf die
zwei großen Schulen des Institutionalismus zurückführen lassen. Die rationalistische Spielart des
Institutionalismus folgt einer Logik der Ressourcenumverteilung und hebt das Fehlen multipler
Vetopositionen sowie das Vorhandensein von unterstützenden Institutionen als den innerstaatlichen
Wandel begünstigende Faktoren hervor. Der soziologische Institutionalismus hingegen stellt auf
Sozialisierungs- und Lernprozesse ab und konzentriert sich dabei auf die Rolle von "norm
entrepreneurs" als Agenten des Wandels sowie auf das Vorhandensein einer kooperativen
politischen Kultur als die beiden Faktoren, die innerstaatliche Veränderungen befördern. Beide
Pfade lassen nur bedingt Konvergenz erwarten, insbesondere hinsichtlich politischer Prozesse und
politischer Institutionen. 
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1. Introduction 
For decades, European studies have mostly been concerned with explaining European integration and
Europeanization processes themselves. Debates between neofunctionalism, (liberal)
intergovernmentalism, and the ”multi-level governance” perspective centered around the question of
how to account for the emerging European polity. This research, therefore, adopted a ”bottom up”
perspective, in which the dynamics and the outcome of the European institution-building process are
the main dependent variable (see e.g. Puchala 1972; Wallace and Wallace 1996; Stone Sweet and
Sandholtz 1998; Moravcsik 1999; Héritier 1999). More recently, however, there is an emerging
literature analyzing the impact of European integration and Europeanization on domestic political
and social processes of the member states and beyond. This move toward studying ”top down”
processes is desperately needed in order to fully capture how Europe and the European Union (EU)
matter. It fits nicely with recent developments in international studies in general which increasingly
study the domestic effects of international institutions and norms. As far as the EU is concerned, we
can only hope for getting a more comprehensive picture if we study the various feedback processes
among and between the various levels of European, national, and subnational governance. 
This paper self-consciously restricts itself to the ”top down” perspective, while we are aware of the
various feedback loops. How do European integration and Europeanization more generally affect
domestic policies, politics, and polities of the member states and beyond? To answer this question,
we review the emerging literature with the aim at developing some preliminary hypotheses on the
conditions under which we would expect domestic change in response to Europeanization. We seek
to simplify various propositions made in the literature and to point out where further research is
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Whether we study policies, politics, or polities, there are two conditions for expecting domestic
changes in response to Europeanization. First, Europeanization must be ”inconvenient,” i.e., there
must be some degree of ”misfit” or incompatibility between European-level processes, policies and
institutions, on the one hand, and domestic-level processes, policies and institutions, on the other.
This degree of fit or misfit constitutes adaptational pressures, which is a necessary but not sufficient
condition for expecting change. The second condition is that there are some facilitating factors – be it
actors, be it institutions – responding to the adaptational pressures. 
Theoretically speaking, there are two ways of conceptualizing the adaptational processes in response
to Europeanization which leads in turn to different emphasis concerning these facilitating factors.
From a rationalist institutionalist perspective following the ”logic of consequentialism” (March and
Olsen 1998), the misfit between European and domestic processes, policies and institutions provides
societal and/or political actors with new opportunities and constraints in the pursuance of their
interests. Whether such changes in the political opportunity structure leads to a domestic
redistribution of power, depends on the capacity of actors to exploit these opportunities and avoid the
constraints. Two mediating factors with opposite effects influence these capacities: 
On the one hand, the existence of multiple veto points in a country’s institutional structure can
effectively empower actors with diverse interests to avoid constraints leading to increased
resistance to change. 
On the other hand, formal institutions might exist providing actors with material and ideational
resources to exploit new opportunities leading to an increased likelihood of change. 
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Thus, the logic of rationalist institutionalism suggests that Europeanization leads to domestic change
through a differential empowerment of actors resulting from a redistribution of resources at the
domestic level. 
In contrast, a sociological institutionalist perspective emphasizes a ”logic of appropriateness” (March
and Olsen 1998) and processes of persuasion. European policies, norms, and the collective
understandings attached to them exert adaptational pressures on domestic-level processes, because
they do not resonate well with domestic norms and collective understandings. Two mediating factors
influence the degree to which such misfit results in the internalization of new norms and the
development of new identities: 
”Change agents” or norm entrepreneurs mobilize in the domestic context and persuade others
to redefine their interests and identities. 
A political culture and other informal institutions exist which are conducive to
consensus-building and cost-sharing. 
Thus, sociological institutionalism suggests that Europeanization leads to domestic change through a
socialization and collective learning process resulting in norm internalization and the development of
new identities. 
Yet, the two logics of change are not mutually exclusive. They often occur simultaneously or
characterize different phases in a process of adaptational change. Our paper concludes with some
suggestions how to link the two mechanisms and to specify conditions when which logic dominates. 
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specify what we mean by ”domestic impact”. Second, we develop the concept of ”misfit” and
distinguish between differential empowerment and socialization as the two theoretical logics of
domestic adaptation to Europe. Third, we discuss the degree and direction of domestic changes to be
expected by the two logics and causal mechanisms focussing on the question whether we are likely to
see convergence or divergence. We conclude with propositions how differential empowerment and
socialization relate to each other. 
2. What is Europeanization and What Does it Do to Us? 
Scholars who adopt a ”top-down” perspective have used the concept of Europeanization in two
different ways, which gave rise to considerable confusion in the literature. 
1. On the one hand, scholars have used ”Europeanization” to describe the ”emergence and the
development at the European level of distinct structures of governance, that is, of political,
legal, and social institutions associated with political problem-solving that formalizes
interactions among the actors, and of policy networks specializing in the creation of
authoritative rules” (Risse, Cowles, and Caporaso 2001: 2). Others have referred to this
process as ”Europeification” (Andersen and Eliassen 1993) or ”Vergemeinschaftung”
(communitarization). Here, Europeanization is the independent variable which impacts upon
domestic processes, policies, and institutions. 
2. On the other hand, Europeanization depicts a ”[an] incremental process re-orienting the
direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become
part of the organizational logic of national politics and policy-making” (Ladrech 1994: 69).
Here, Europeanization connotes the processes and mechanisms by which European
institution-building may cause change at the domestic level.(1) 
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For pragmatic reasons and since we are interested in understanding both the processes by which
European integration affects domestic change and the outcome of this change, we follow the first
conceptualization of Europeanization as a process of institution-building at the European level and
explore how this Europeanization process impacts upon the member states. 
We distinguish three major dimensions along which the domestic impact of Europeanization can be
analyzed and processes of domestic change be traced (see figure 1 below): 
Policies 
There are more and more policy areas that are affected by policy-making in Brussels. The European
Union produces around 500 policy decisions per year. The current body of Community Legislation
comprises over 5.000 Directives and Regulations. The Europeanization of some policy areas, such
environment and agriculture, reached a degree where more than 80% of existing policies are made at
the European level. The implementation of European policies leads to substantial changes in the
policy fabric of the member states. Such Europe-induced policy changes can affect the policy style,
the general problem-solving approach, the policy instruments used, and the policy standards set
(Knill and Lenschow 1998; Haverland 2000). Policy changes, however, often have broader
repercussion on legal and administrative structures, patterns of interest intermediation, and policy
narratives and discourses (Héritier et al. forthcoming; Schneider 2000; Caporaso and Jupille 2001;
Radaelli 1997; Schmidt 2000; Liebert 2000). 
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If policies are increasingly made at the European level, this is likely to have consequences for
domestic processes of societal interest formation, aggregation, and representation. There are many
studies on how domestic actors strive to channel their interests into the European policy-making
process (Mazey and Richardson 1993; Marks and McAdam 1996; Aspinwall and Greenwood 1998).
Less has been done on the Europeanization of electoral and party politics (Greven 1992; Featherstone
1988). But we hardly know anything about how the emergence of a European structure of political
and societal interest representation impacts on processes of political contestation and interest
aggregation in the member states. While Mair, for example, argues that Europeanization contributes
to de-politicization, indifference, and political disengagement (Mair 2000), Radaelli and Harcourt
contend that European policy-making causes an increasing politicization at the domestic level
(Hartcourt and Radaelli 1999). Yet, there is a growing literature on how Europeanization affects
public discourses (Schmidt 2000; Marcussen 2000; Liebert 2000). 
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Polity 
Most works on the impact of Europeanization focus on domestic institutions, both formal and
informal. They analyze whether and to what extent European processes, policies, and institutions
affect domestic systems of interest intermediation (Schmidt 1996; Cowles 2001; Héritier et al.
forthcoming), intergovernmental relations (Jones and Keating 1995; Hooghe 1996b; Jeffery 1997;
Börzel 2001), national bureaucracies (Page and Wouters 1995) and administrative structures (Wright
1994; Rometsch and Wessels 1996; Knill forthcoming), regulatory structures (Majone 1997;
Schneider 2000), the relationship between executive and legislature (Andersen and Burns 1996;
Norton 1996; Börzel 2000a); judicial structures (Conant 2001; Caporaso and Jupille 2001), state
traditions (Kohler-Koch 1996; Kohler-Koch 1998b), macro-economic institutions (Dyson and
Featherstone 1996; Dyson and Featherstone 1999), and national identities (Risse 2001; Checkel
2001). These studies focus either on specific policies and explore changes in the political, legal, and
administrative structures that interpret and carry out policies. Or they are concerned with
”system-wide” institutions pertaining to the member-states, their societies and economies as a whole.
Figure 1
Whether the focus is on policies, politics, or polity, the general proposition that Europeanization
affects the member states is non-controversial. Against earlier approaches, there is also an emerging
consensus that the domestic impact of Europeanization is differential (see Cowles, Caporaso, and
Risse 2001; Héritier et al. forthcoming; Kohler-Koch 1998b). Hence, the issue is no longer whether
Europe matters but how it matters, to what degree, in what direction, at what pace, and at what point
of time. 
3. How Europeanization Matters 
The literature has identified several mechanisms through which Europeanization can affect the
member states. Christoph Knill and Dirk Lehmkuhl distinguish between institutional compliance,
where the EU prescribes a particular model which is ”imposed” on the member states, changing
domestic opportunity structures, which leads to a redistribution of resources between domestic
actors, and policy framing, which alters the beliefs of domestic actors (Knill and Lehnkuhl 1999; on
framing see also Radaelli 1999; Kohler-Koch 1996). Others emphasize judicial review, i.e. the right
of any affected party to challenge deficient implementation of Community Law before national
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regulatory competition, triggered by the dismantling of trade barriers which provides firms with exit
options from national jurisdictions (Majone 1996; Sun and Pelkmans 1995). 
Most studies draw on one or several of these mechanisms to explain the domestic change they
observe (see e.g. Héritier, Knill, and Mingers 1996; Héritier et al. forthcoming; Hooghe 1996a;
Börzel 1998; Haverland 1999). Below, we argue that the different causal mechanisms can be
collapsed into two logics of domestic change. 
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3.1 Misfit as the Necessary Condition of Domestic Change 
While focussing on different causal mechanisms, most studies share the common proposition that
Europeanization is only likely to result in domestic change if it is ”inconvenient”. There must be
some ”misfit” (Börzel 1999; Duina 1999) or ”mismatch” (Héritier, Knill, and Mingers 1996)
between European and domestic policies, processes, and institutions. The ”goodness of fit” (Risse,
Cowles, and Caporaso 2001) between the European and the domestic level determines the degree of
pressure for adaptation generated by Europeanization on the member states. The lower the
compatibility between European and domestic processes, policies, and institutions, the higher the
adaptational pressure. If European norms, rules, and the collective understandings attached to them
are largely compatible with those at the domestic level, they do not give rise to problems of
compliance or effective implementation more generally speaking. Nor do they provide new
opportunities and constraints to domestic actors which could lead to a redistribution of power
resources at the domestic level. European policy frames which resonate with domestic policy ideas
and discourses are unlikely to trigger collective learning processes which could change actors’
interests and identities. The European system of judicial review only empowers national courts and
citizens in member states whose legal systems are alien to judicial review. The Single Market,
finally, only provides exit options for firms which used to operate within closed and protected
markets. 
Ultimately, adaptational pressures are generated by the fact that the emerging European polity
encompasses structures of authoritative decision-making which might clash with national structures
of policy-making and that the EU member states have no exit option given that EU law constitutes
the law of the land. This is a major difference to other international institutions which are simply
based on voluntary intergovernmental arrangements. There are two types of misfits by which
Europeanization exerts adaptational pressure on the member states. First, European policies might
cause a ”policy misfit” between European rules and regulations, on the one hand, and domestic
policies, on the other. Here, policy misfits essentially equal compliance problems. European policies
can challenge national policy goals, regulatory standards, the instruments or techniques used to
achieve policy goals, and/or the underlying problem-solving approach (Héritier, Knill, and Mingers
1996; Börzel 2000c). Such policy misfit can also exert adaptational pressure on underlying
institutions (Caporaso and Jupille 2001; Schneider 2000; Sbragia 2000; Börzel 1998). As policy
misfits produce adaptational costs at the domestic level, member state strive to ”upload” their
policies to the European level. This ”regulatory competition” particularly among the more powerful
member states gave rise to a ”regulatory patchwork” of EU rules and regulations (Héritier 1996;
Héritier, Knill, and Mingers 1996). As a result, all member states – including the ”Big Three” – may
face significant, albeit different degrees of adaptational pressures when they have to ”download”
European policies (Cowles and Risse 2001; Börzel 2000c). 
Second, Europeanization can cause ”institutional misfit” challenging domestic rules and procedures
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national governments privileged decision powers vis-à-vis other domestic actors, challenge the
territorial institutions of highly decentralized member states which grant their regions autonomous
decision powers (Börzel 1999). The accessibility of the European Commission for societal interests
challenges the statist business-government relations in France and the corporatist system of interest
mediation in Germany (Cowles 2001; Conant 2001). Europeanization might even threaten deeply
collective understandings of national identity as it touches upon constitutive norms such as state
sovereignty (Risse 2001; Checkel 2001). Institutional misfit is less direct than policy misfit.
Although it can result in substantial adaptational pressure, its effect is more likely to be long-term
and incremental (see below). 
Policy or institutional misfit, however, is only the necessary condition for domestic change. Whether
misfits produce a substantial effect at the domestic level, depends on the presence of some factors
facilitating adaptation as the sufficient condition of domestic change. 
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3.2 Facilitating Factors as the Sufficient Condition of Domestic Change 
The domestic effect of Europeanization can be conceptualized as a process of change at the domestic
level in which the member states adapt their processes, policies, and institutions to new practices,
norms, rules, and procedures that emanate from the emergence of a European system of governance
(Olsen 1996, 1997). Rationalist Institutionalism and Sociological Institutionalism identify two
different mechanisms of institutional change, which can be equally applied to the change of policies
and politics.(2) The two mechanisms or logics of change stress different factors facilitating domestic
adaptation in response to Europeanization. 
Domestic Change as a Process of the Redistribution of Resources 
Rationalist institutionalism embodies a ”logic of consequentialism” (March and Olsen 1989, 1998),
which treats actors as rational, goal-oriented and purposeful. Actors engage in strategic interactions
using their resources to maximize their utilities on the basis of given, fixed and ordered preferences.
They follow an instrumental rationality by weighing the costs and benefits of different strategy
options taking into account the (anticipated) behavior of other actors. From this perspective,
Europeanization is largely conceived as an emerging political opportunity structure which offers
some actors additional resources to exert influence, while severely constraining the ability of others
to pursue their goals. Liberal intergovernmentalists suggest that European opportunities and
constraints strengthen the action capacities of national executives enhancing their autonomy vis-à-vis
other domestic actors (Moravcsik 1994). Neofunctionalists come to the opposite conclusion that
Europeanization provides societal and subnational actors with new resources, since the EU enables
them to circumvent or by-pass the national executives (Marks 1993; Sandholtz 1996). Proponents of
multilevel governance approaches in turn argue that Europeanization does not empower one
particular group of actors over the others but increases their mutual interdependence giving rise to
more cooperative forms of governance (Kohler-Koch 1996; Grande 1996; Rhodes 1997). The three
resource dependency approaches predict convergence albeit around very different outcomes. 
Neither can account for the differential impact of Europeanization observed at the domestic level:
Europeanization does not systematically favour one particular group of domestic actors over others.
For instance, while French firms gained more autonomy vis-à-vis their national government by
circumventing (Schmidt 1996), Spanish firms did not (Aguilar Fernandez 1992). The Italian regions
have been far less able to ascertain their domestic power than their Austrian or British counterparts
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undergoing profound change, German federalism has been reinforced by Europeanization. Whereas
the equal pay and equal treatment directives empowered womens’ groups in Great Britain, they had
virtually no effect in France (Caporaso and Jupille 2001). 
We argue that Europeanization only leads to a redistribution of resources and differential
empowerment at the domestic level if, first, there is considerable misfit which provides actors with
new opportunities and constraints. And second, domestic actors must have the capacities to exploit
new opportunities and avoid constraints. Two mediating factors influence these action capacities (cf.
Risse, Cowles, and Caporaso 2001: 11-12). 
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1. The existence of multiple veto points in a country's institutional structure can empower actors
with diverse interests to avoid constraints and, thus, effectively inhibit domestic adaptation
(Tsebelis 1995; Haverland 2000; Héritier et al. forthcoming). The more power is dispersed
across the political system and the more actors have a say in political decision-making, the
more difficult it is to foster the domestic consensus or "winning coalition" necessary to
introduce changes in response to Europeanization pressures. A large number of institutional or
factual veto players thus impinges on the capacity of domestic actors to achieve policy changes
and qualifies their empowerment. The European liberalization of the transport sector, for
example, empowered societal and political actors in highly regulated member states, which had
been un-successfully pushing for privatization and deregulation. But while the German reform
coalition was able to exploit European policies to overcome domestic opposition to
liberalization, Italian trade unions and sectoral associations successfully blocked any reform
attempt (Héritier et al. forthcoming; Kerwer and Teutsch forthcoming). 
2. Existing formal institutions can provide actors with material and ideational resources necessary
to exploit European opportunities and thus promote domestic adaptation. The European
political opportunity structure may offer domestic actors additional resources. But they are not
able to deploy them when they lack the necessary action capacity. Direct relations with
European deci-sion-makers provide regions with the opportunity to circumvent their central
government in European policy-making. But many regions do not have sufficient resources
(manpower, money, expertise) to be permanently present at the European level and, thus, to
exploit the new opportunities. While Bavaria or Catalunya are strong enough to maintain
regular relations with EU institutions, Estremadura or Bremen simply lack the action capacity
to do this. Many re-gions then rely on their central governments to channel their interests into
the European policy process (Jeffery 2000). In the UK, public agencies and related
complementary institutions helped women's organizations with the means to use EU equal pay
and equal treatment direc-tives in furthering gender equality. In the absence of such a formal
institution, French women were not able to overcome domestic resistance to implement the EU
equal pay and equal treat-ment policies (Caporaso and Jupille 2001; Tesoka 1999). 
The existence of multiple veto points and formal facilitating institutions determine whether policy
and institutional misfit lead to the differential empowerment of domestic actors as a result of which
domestic processes, policies, and institutions change. This rationalist institutionalist logic of
domestic change combines various Europeanization mechanisms identified in the literature. It
captures and qualifies the propositions on changing opportunity structures arising from the European
system of judicial review, the implementation of European policies, or regulatory competition. 
Domestic Change as a Process of Socialization and Learning 
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and Olsen 1998) which argues that actors are guided by collectively shared understandings of what
constitutes proper, i.e. socially accepted behavior in a given rule structure. These collective
understandings and intersubjective meaning structures strongly influence the way actors define their
goals and what they perceive as rational action. Rather than maximizing their subjective desires,
actors strive to fulfill social expectations in a given situation. From this perspective, Europeanization
is understood as the emergence of new rules, norms, practices, and structures of meaning to which
member states are exposed and which they have to incorporate into their domestic structures. 
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Sociological institutionalism offers two potential explanations for domestic change in response to
Europeanization, one more structuralist, the other more agency-centered. The first account focusses
on institutional isomorphism suggesting that institutions which frequently interact, are exposed to
each other or are located in a similar environment, over time develop similarities in formal
organizational structures, principles of resource allocation, practices, meaning structures, and reform
patterns (Meyer and Rowan 1991; DiMaggio and Powell 1991; Scott and Meyer 1994a). Institutional
isomorphism explains process of homogenization of organizational structures over time. Thus, it
ultimately rests on a form of structural determinism assuming that actors will strive to match
institutions to environmental changes. Rather than adapting to functional imperatives, organizations
respond to changes in their normative and cognitive environment giving rise to institutional
isomorphy. The conditions for isomorphy can vary. Isomorphy appears to be most likely in
environments with stable, formalized and clearcut organizational structures (Scott and Meyer 1994a:
118). Yet, provided that institutions are exposed to such an environment, they are supposed to
respond by similar changes in their institutional structure. This poses serious problems in explaining
variation in institutional adaptation to a similar environment. In sum, this version of sociological
institutionalism is as unable to account for the differential impact of Europe as the resource
dependency approaches discussed above. 
But there is a second, more agency-centered version of sociological institutionalism which theorizes
precisely differences in the degree to which domestic norms and institutions change in response to
international institutional arrangements. This version focusses on socialization processes by which
actors learn to internalize new norms and rules in order to become members of (international) society
”in good standing” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Actors are socialized into new norms and rules of
appropriateness through processes of persuasion and social learning and redefine their interests and
identities accordingly (cf. Checkel 1999a, b). This perspective generates expectations about the
differential impact of Europeanization, since ”misfit” constitutes the starting condition of a
socialization process. The more European norms, ideas, structures of meaning, or practices resonate
(fit) with those at the domestic level, the more likely will they be incorporated into existing domestic
institutions (Olsen 1996: 272) and the less likely they are to produce domestic change. While Council
of Europe’ citizenship norms resonate well with traditional citizenship practices in France, they
directly contradicted the historical understandings of citizenship in Germany (ius sanguinis), thus
creating a serious misfit (Checkel 2001). The idea of cooperative governance emulated by the
European Commission fits German cooperative federalism but challenges statist policy-making
practices in Italy and Greece (Kohler-Koch 1998b). Yet, cognitive or normative misfit does not
necessarily result into domestic change. Domestic actors and institutions often resist change despite
significant pressure for adaptation. 
We argue that two mediating factors account for the degree to which misfit leads to processes of
socialization and learning which lead to the internalization of new norms and the development of
new identities: 
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1. ”Change agents” or norm entrepreneurs mobilize at the domestic level. In contrast to
rationalist institutionalist arguments, norm entrepreneurs do not only mobilize to pressure
policy-makers to initiate change by increasing the costs of certain strategy options. Rather, they
persuade actors to redefine their interests and identities engaging them in processes of social
learning. There are two types of norm- and idea-promoting agents. Epistemic communities are
networks of actors with an authoritative claim to knowledge and a normative agenda (Haas
1992a). They legitimate new norms and ideas by providing scientific knowledge about
cause-and-effect relationships. Epistemic communities are the more influential in inducing
change, the higher the uncertainty about cause-and-effect relationships in the particular
issue-area among policy-makers, the higher the consensus among the scientists involved, and
the more scientific advice is institutionalized in the policy-making process (Haas 1990, 1992b;
Adler and Haas 1992). In case of the single currency, the coalition of central bankers and
national technocrats successfully advocated a monetarist approach which produced dramatic
changes in domestic monetary policy, even in countries like Italy and Greece which had to
undergo painful adaptation (Dyson and Featherstone 1999; Radaelli 1998). Advocacy or
principled issue networks are bound together by shared beliefs and values rather than by
consensual knowledge (Keck and Sikkink 1998). They appeal to collectively shared norms and
identities in order to persuade other actors to reconsider their goals and preferences. Such
processes of complex or ”double-loop” learning (Agyris and Schön 1980), in which actors
change their interests and identities as opposed to merely adjusting their means and strategies,
occur rather rarely. They usually take place after critical policy failure or in perceived crises
and in situations of strong uncertainty (Checkel 1999). While persuasion and social learning
are mostly identified with processes of policy change, they can also have an effect on domestic
institutions. As Checkel argues, Germany underwent a profound and constitutive change of its
citizenship norms resulting from a learning process instigated by an advocacy network
(Checkel 2001). 
2. A political culture and other informal institutions exist which are conducive to
consensus-building and cost-sharing. Informal institutions entail collective understandings of
appropriate behavior (March and Olsen 1989) that strongly influence the ways in which
domestic actors re-spond to Europeanization pressures. First, a consensus-oriented or
cooperative decision-making culture helps to overcome multiple veto points by rendering their
use for actors inappropriate. Cooperative federalism prevented the German Länder from
vetoing any of the European Treaty revisions which deprived them of core decision powers
(Börzel 1999, 2001). Likewise, the liti-gational culture of Germany encouraged its citizens to
appeal to national courts for the deficient application of Community Law, while such a culture
was absent in France where litigation is much lower (Conant 2001). Second, a
consensus-oriented political culture allows for a sharing of adaptational costs which facilitates
the accommodation of pressure for adaptation (Katzenstein 1984; Katzenstein 1985). Rather
than shifting adaptational costs upon a social or political minority, the "winners" of domestic
change compensate the "losers". The German gov-ernment shared its decision powers in
European policy-making with the Länder to make up for their Europe-induced power losses.
Likewise, the consensual corporatist decision-making cul-ture in the Netherlands and Germany
facilitated the liberalization of the transport sector by of-fering compensation to the employees
as the potential losers of the domestic changes (Héritier 2001; Héritier et al. forthcoming). A
confrontation and pluralist culture, on the other hand, may inhibit domestic change, as the
example of the Spanish regions in response to Europeanization pressures documents. The
competitive institutional culture initially prevented the regions from cooperating with the
Spanish central state in order to reap the benefits of Europeanization and to share its costs,
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The existence of norm entrepreneurs and consensus-oriented cultures affect whether European ideas,
norms and the collective understandings which do not resonate with those at the domestic level, are
internalized by domestic actors giving rise to domestic change. This sociological institutionalist logic
of domestic change embodies the cognitive and normative Europeanization mechanisms such as
policy framing and norm diffusion, which the literature has identified so far. It also incorporates
mimetic processes whereby institutions emulate others to reduce uncertainty and complexity
(DiMaggio and Powell 1991; Radaelli 2000). 
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The two logics of domestic change which are summarized in figure 2, are not mutually exclusive.
The often work simultaneously or dominate different phases of the adaptational process. We come
back to this point in the concluding part of the paper. 
Figure 2 
4. Where Do the Effects of Europeanization Take Us?   
The two logics generate different propositions about the degree and direction of domestic change.
Both take misfit as the necessary condition of domestic change and converge around the expectation
that the lower the misfit, the smaller the pressure for adaptation and thus the lower the degree of
domestic change. But the two logics depart on the effect of high adaptational pressure. 
4.1 Absorption, Accommodation, or Transformation? 
Europeanization can cause three different degrees of domestic change: 
Absorption: member states are able to incorporate European policies or ideas and readjust their
institutions, respectively, without substantially modifying existing processes, policies, and
institutions. The degree of domestic change is low. 
Accommodation: member states accommodate Europeanization pressure by adapting existing
processes, policies and institutions without changing their essential features and the underlying
collective understandings attached to them. One way of doing this is by ”patching up” new
policies and institutions onto existing ones without changing the latter (Héritier 2001). The
degree of domestic change is modest. 
Transformation: member states replace existing policies, processes, and institutions by new,
substantially different ones, or alter existing ones to the extent that their essential features
and/or the underlying collective understandings are fundamentally changes. The degree of
domestic change is high. 
The rationalist institutionalist perspective suggests that the more new opportunities and constraints
Europeanization provides (high adaptational pressure), the more likely is a redistribution of
resources, which may alter the domestic balance of power and which may empower domestic actors
to effectively mobilize for policy change by overriding domestic veto points. Medium adaptational
pressure is also likely to result in domestic transformation if there are supporting formal institutions.
In the presence of multiple veto points, however, medium adaptational pressure will be at best
accommodated if not absorbed, even if this means non-compliance in case of policy misfit. Finally,
the mere absorption of low pressure of adaptation may be prevented by formal institutions which
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Sociological institutionalism, by contrast, argues that high adaptational pressure is likely to meet
strong institutional inertia preventing any domestic change. New norms, rules, and practices do not
simply replace or harmonize existing ones. Profound and abrupt changes should only be expected
under conditions of crisis or external coercion (Olsen 1996). Actors are more open to learning and
persuasion, if new norms and ideas, albeit ”inconvenient”, are compatible with collectively shared
understandings and meaning structures. Therefore, medium pressure for adaptation is most likely to
result in domestic transformation, at least in the long run. Processes of adaptation evolve along
institutional paths. 
In sum, the two logics predict opposite outcomes under conditions of high adaptational pressure.
Moreover, sociological institutionalism would expect domestic change beyond absorption only as the
result of a long-term process of incremental adaptation (cf. figure 3). 
Figure 3 
4.2 Convergence or Divergence? 
The question of convergence and divergence is the trickiest one. Answers may vary according to the
level at which one looks for convergence (Knill and Lenschow forthcoming) and the issue
supposedly subject to convergence. What looks like convergence at the marco-level, may still show a
significant degree of divergence at the micro-level. The Economic and Monetary Union gave rise to
policy convergence among the 11 members with regard to inflation and budgetary restraints as well
as to institutional convergence concerning the independence of central banks. But it did not lead to
similar institutional arrangements in the economic and fiscal policy area. And the means by which
the member states reduced their budget deficits varied enormously. While member states responded
to the liberalization of telecommunication by creating independent regulatory agencies, they adopted
different institutional setups, reflecting variation in administrative structures (Schneider 2001;
Böllhoff 2000). In any case, policy convergence seems to be more likely than institutional
convergence as policy changes are more easily achieved (see the chapters in Cowles, Caporaso, and
Risse 2001). Moreover, EU rules and regulations require convergence in policy outcomes (such as
low inflation or budgetary restraint in the case of EMU), while they leave quite some discretionary
power to the member states with regard to the means how to ensure compliance. Thus, we need to
specify what we mean by ”policy convergence”, convergence in outcome (which equals compliance
with EU law and, thus, is not particularly interesting to observe) or convergence in policy processes
and instruments. This is often confused in the literature as a result of which we know surprisingly
little about the degree of policy convergence not related to policy outcomes. 
As to the degree of institutional convergence, resource dependency and sociological institutionalist
approaches generally lean towards convergence. Resource dependency predicts a redistribution of
resources strengthening one group of actors over the others or reinforcing their mutual dependence.
Sociological institutionalist arguments about institutional isomorphism suggest that institutions
which frequently interact, are exposed to each other, or are located in a similar environment, become
more similar over time (Meyer and Rowan 1991; DiMaggio and Powell 1991; Scott and Meyer
1994b). Yet, by now, we have sufficient empirical evidence which shows that the outcome of the
domestic effect of Europeanization is diverse. 
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The most comprehensive empirical study on the domestic institutional effects of Europeanization so
far showed that most of empirical instance of domestic institutional change fall in the ”mixed”
category whereby some countries converged toward similar policy or system-wide structures, while
others retained their specific institutional arrangements, state society relations, or cultural
understandings (Cowles, Caporaso, and Risse 2001; cf. Kohler-Koch 1998a; Héritier et al.
forthcoming; for the following see Cowles and Risse 2001). Convergence did not mean the
homogenization of domestic structures. There is no evidence that domestic institutional change
meant the complete rejection of national administrative styles, legal cultures, societal relationships,
and/or collective identities. France did not shed its national identity per se when adopting a European
one. The meanings of ”Europe” differed in the German and French political discourses, even though
the elites in both countries have incorporated Europeanness into their collective nation-state
identities (Risse 2001). The traditional tensions between the Spanish regions and central government
did not disappear as a result of a more cooperative arrangement in territorial matters (Börzel 2000b).
Moreover, there is no general convergence toward cooperative federalism in Europe, just a
movement toward such structures among federal states such as Germany and Spain. 
These findings disconfirm those schools of thought that expect strong structural convergence.
According to the economic convergence school, we would expect increasing similarities in
institutional arrangements in areas exposed to global market forces, i.e., mostly areas of negative
integration. While the case of telecommunications confirms the argument, the EMU case does not
(see above). Others have argued, in contrast, that EU policies of positive integration prescribe
concrete institutional models for domestic compliance which should then result in institutional
convergence (Knill and Lehnkuhl 1999; Radaelli 2000). The studies cited above disconfirm this
proposition, too. 
Irrespective of the pressures of adaptation, every member state has a different set of institutions and
actors facilitating or inhibiting change in response to these pressures. Multiple veto points,
supporting formal institutions, norm entrepreneurs, and cooperative formal institutions mediate
between the adaptational pressures and the outcome of domestic change. Thus, the facilitating factors
identified by our two logics of domestic change can explain the absence of full convergence and
should lead us to expect only partial or, at best, some ”clustered convergence” (Börzel 1999) where
some member states converge toward similar policies or institutions, but others do not. Member
states facing similar pressure for adaptation, are likely to converge around similar outcomes, because
similar actors are empowered and are likely to learn from each other in searching ways of how to
respond to adaptational pressure. Thus, the regions of federal and regionalized member states by now
rely on cooperation with their central government to inject their interests into the European policy
process, a finding which does not hold for less decentralized member states (Börzel 1999). 
5. Conclusions: Toward Integrating the Two Logics of
Domestic Change 
We have argued in this paper in favor of a rather parsimonious theoretical approach to the study of
the domestic impact of Europeanization. Whether we study policies, politics, or polities, a misfit
between European-level and domestic processes, policies, or institutions constitutes the necessary
condition for expecting any change. However, adaptational pressures alone are insufficient. There
must be mediating factors enabling or prohibiting domestic change and accounting for the
empirically observable differential impact of Europe. We have then introduced two pathways leading
to domestic changes which are theoretically grounded in rationalist and sociological
institutionalisms, respectively. On the one hand, rationalist institutionalism follows a logic of
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supporting institutions as the main factors facilitating change. On the other hand, sociological
institutionalism exhibits a socialization and learning account focussing on norm entrepreneurs as
”change agents” and the presence of a cooperative political culture as the main mediating factors. We
claim that Europeanization might lead to convergence in policy outcomes, but at best to ”clustered
convergence” and continuing divergence with regard to policy processes and instruments, politics,
and polities. 
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However, the two pathways identified in this paper are by no means mutually exclusive. They often
occur simultaneously or characterize different phases in processes of adaptational change. Future
research has to figure out how the two pathways and causal mechanisms relate to each other. In
conclusion, we offer some suggestions. We essentially build upon March and Olsen’s (1998,
952-953) interpretations of how the logic of consequentialism and the logic of appropriateness may
be linked. First, a clear logic dominates an unclear logic. In the case of Europeanization, this would
mean that the ”socialization/learning” pathway is the more likely to be followed, the more actors are
uncertain about their preferences and strategy options, but are clear about their identities. In contrast,
the ”resource redistribution” pathway is likely to prevail if actors’ preferences are well-defined and
the available strategy options known. 
Second, the two pathways might relate to each other in a sequential way. E.g., norm entrepreneurs
might be empowered by supportive institutions, but then start a socialization process of persuasion in
order to overcome multiple veto points in the domestic system. In contrast, if domestic change in
response to Europeanization involves high redistributional costs, a socialization process might be
necessary to overcome stalemate and to develop new rules of fairness on the basis of which actors
can then bargain over the distribution of costs. 
Finally, the logic of consequentialism exogenizes preferences and identities, while the logic of
appropriateness endogenizes them. As a result, the more Europeanization exerts adaptational
pressures on constitutive and deeply embedded institutions (such as citizenship rules) and collective
identities, the more the socialization/learning pathway is necessary to induce constitutive change. 
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(1) For an attempt to integrate both approaches see Radaelli 2000.
(2) The following draws on Olsen 1996; Börzel 2001; Checkel 1999.
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Two logics of Domestic Change
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Figure 3
The Different Degrees of Domestic Change
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